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Unfair Trading Practices – The EDEKA case


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EDEKA case | Timeline

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EDEKA case | Five requests

1	Most favored value comparison of past net-net purchase prices	Comparison using three reference dates in the past
2	Most favored value comparison of payment dates	No consideration of package of terms and conditions
3	Synergy bonus of 0.5% of total turnover	Without measurable synergy gains
4	Partnership bonus of 4% on previous turnover	To make Plus shops more attractive
5	Extension of product range bonus of 10% on expected additional turnover or 40 euros per item	Without measurable return service as no specific listing commitment



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Concept of unfair trading practices under German law

Addressee	Dominant buyers (retailer)	Presumption: As of 40% market share
	Each buyer (retailer) in relation to suppliers which are dependent on the buyer	 General position buyer downstream market General position buyer procurement market Position on affected procurement market Bilateral positioning, i.e. sales share buyer
Prohibited	Buyer requests economic advantage	 Advantage: bonus, rebate, payments, date of payment etc Every request or ultimate request ?
	without objective justification (delineation towards "hard bargaining")	 <u>New criteria in EDEKA case:</u> advantage/service reasonably linked Reasoning/calculation of request and service comprehensible (transparent) Advantage proportionate (only evidence test)
Possible	 Cease and desist order 	
consequences	Fine	Up to 10% turnover
	 Damage claims 	FCO decision binding



EDEKA case | Theory of harm

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High concentration on retail market	EDEKA market leaderOnly two other relevant retail groups
Smaller retailers are no longer independent	 Smaller retailers often members of same buying group with market leaders No independent negotiation of purchase conditions
Strong link between purchase conditions and downstream market position	 Smaller retailers need protection against better purchase conditions achieved unfairly by market leaders
EDEKA requests prevent suppliers from offering better conditions to smaller retailers	 Suppliers need to avoid negative consequences following future acquisitions Waterbed effect: split of purchase conditions
Concentration will be fostered	Market leaders gain market shares steadilySpiral effect

The concept of consumer welfare is not limited to "price" and "volume" but also requires to consider the impact on "product quality" and "innovation"



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